research in computability theory over the subsequent thirty three years, and that the broad concerns underlying them promise to mold the direction of such research well into the next century. In this article, we retrace the history of computability theory since 1965 in relation to the questions raised by Rogers, and try to shed a little more light on those for which solutions have yet to appear.
Little is assumed in the way of detailed knowledge of computability theory, and that that is can be easily gleaned from the earlier chapters of say Odifreddi [1989] , or Soare [1987] .
Definability and Invariance
Rogers' main contribution was a new emphasis on 'global' characteristics of the basic structures of computability theory (or recursion theory, as it was then known), such as those related to invariance and definability.
In general, given a structure U = U, R 0 , . . . , F 0 , . . . , with R 0 , . . . , F 0 , . . . being the respective relations and functions over U , a subset V ⊆ U is (first-order) definable in U if and only if x ∈ V can be expressed as ϕ(x) for some formula ϕ in the first-order language L U for U . So, for example, if U = N, +, × then the definable sets are the familiar arithmetical sets.
Distrusting the dependence of such a definition on a particular language, Rogers looked for an absolute notion of a set being specified by the structure U . We say that V ⊆ U is invariant in U if and only if f (V ) = V for every automorphism of U . (Rogers originally adopted the term absolutely definable, but this has come to have a different meaning in computability theory -see Odifreddi [1989], pp. 540-543.) Some simple examples illustrate the sort of systemic characteristics that can now be ascribed to a given U . For U = N, +, × or N, ≤ , the automorphism group Aut (U) of U is just {Id} , in which case every relation on U is invariant, and, in the standard terminology, U is said to be rigid . (This example plays an important role in relation to bi interpretability, of which there will be more later.) For U = Z, + , one gets Aut (U) = {Id, f } where f (n) = −n for all n ∈ Z , and one has a more complicated situation with some relations (e.g., {−1, 1} ) invariant, and others (such as {1} ), not. While for U = Z, ≤ there are no invariant sets other than Z and ∅ . Less trivially, it emerged over time that each of these typical situations finds parallels with regard to the familiar structures of computability theory.
An obvious question is that of the actual relationship between invariance and definability, observing that definable relations are of course invariant, and that in particular cases invariant relations can often be seen to be definable, particularly if a stronger language is allowed. (For instance, in the second of the above examples one can define {−1, 1} in second-order arithmetic as the set of those elements which generate Z, + .) Rogers observes, in support of his choice of invariance as a notion of absolute definability, that if the language is strong enough, possibly infinitary, then there is no distinction. For instance:
• Given U, R , with just one binary relation R , and V ⊆ U , then V is invariant if and only if V is definable in L αβ (with predicate symbol for R ), some α, β .
To see this, let κ be an ordinal of cardinality the same as that of U , and let
The exact qualification of the relationship between invariance and definability has become a recurrent theme in the history of the subject, and it turns out that one can do much better than this for specific structures.
Rogers singled out four basic structures of computability theory for particular attention.
The Computably Enumerable Sets
The first of the four structures considered by Rogers was also historically the first to have received detailed scrutiny, in the seminal paper of Post [1944] . In fact, Rogers' questions in relation to it turned out to be less influential than in regard to the other three, but do establish some dominant themes.
There are actually two basic structures -E , that of the computably enumerable sets with ∪ and ∩ , and E * = E/F , the window on its essential algebraic structure, got by identifying finitely differing sets. Two easy facts set the stage for Rogers' Question (g):
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(1) Any computable permutation of N induces an automorphism of E * , and (2) (Kent [1962] ) There exist 2 ℵ 0 automorphisms of E .
Kent's proof used the fact that any permutation of a cohesive set (that is, an infinite set whose intersection with each computably enumerable set, or its complement, is finite) produces an automorphism of E . But since all such automorphisms only induce Id: E * −→ E * , it was natural to ask (a first attempt at characterising Aut (E/F) ):
Rogers' Question (g). Is every automorphism of E/F induced by a computable permutation of N ?
Of course, this would have been too good to be true, and the question did not last long. If one puts together a finite collection of computable permutations on disjoint computable subsets of N , then one still has a computable permutation. So combining an infinite collection of such permutations, one for each member of a disjoint covering of N , one still gets an automorphism of E/F so long as one ensures that for each computably enumerable set, either it or its complement is covered by a finite subcollection of the covering. This was the key (see Soare [1974b] ) to Lachlan's piecing together of computable permutations in a noncomputable way to get uncountably many automorphisms of E * .
On the other hand, (Soare [1974b] ) every automorphism of E * is induced by some permutation of N , and so (positively answering Rogers' Question (g ′ )), by some automorphism of E . But this was only a small step towards a characterisation of Aut (E/F) .
Leaving aside the automorphism group, the other major theme concerns the problem of characterising the invariant relations of a given structure. Again, Rogers had a specific suggestion:
Rogers' Question (f). If P ⊆ 2 N , does P recursively invariant and well-defined on E * imply that P is invariant in E * ?
An affirmative answer would have provided a whole range of natural and familiar invariant properties of computably enumerable sets -for example, that of being hypersimple (originating with Post's [1944] paper). Of course, the answer was again negative (which included a negative answer to question (f ′′ )). But Martin's construction (first published in Soare [1974b] ), of an automorphism of E * taking a hypersimple set to a computably enumerable set which was not hypersimple, had a longer term significance in providing the technical starting point of much of the modern theory of E * , soon to become manifest in two remarkable new papers (Soare [1974a (Soare [ ], [1974b ).
It is interesting to note that Rogers' own suggested candidate for a counterexample (Myhill's [1955] property of being creative) unexpectedly 3 , many years later, turned out to be definable in E * , and so invariant. This result of Harrington was all the more surprising for being in a context in which the scales had tilted heavily in favour of the uncountably many automorphisms, and against definability in E/F . Admittedly undecidability of the related theory had been tortuously arrived at (by both Harrington and Herrmann [1984] , in rather different ways), but, for instance, all attempts at recreating some form of bi interpretability, so successful in relation to the degree structures, seemed doomed to failure. Concerning the exact relationship between invariance (in E/F ) and definability in E/F (or, equivalently, in E , by a result of Lachlan), Nies [1997] (see also Harrington and Nies [1998] ) has proved that there is a property of computably enumerable sets that is invariant in E * and definable in first-order arithmetic but which is not definable in E * .
In fact (see Soare [1987] , pp. 339-341) Harrington showed the creative sets to form a single orbit. Given Myhill's [1955] proof that the creative sets form a single m-complete m-degree, this also has important degree theoretic consequences, of course. Which leads one naturally on to ask:
What did Rogers not anticipate?
A very significant pointer in a new direction appeared just in time to be listed in Rogers' [1967b] book (in a list of 16 "further results", many unpublished at that time, on p. 294). Both confirming Post's [1944] expectation of links between definability in E * and the structure of the Turing degrees, and turning the related research programme on its head, Martin [1966] showed that maximality in E/F could be used to characterise the high computably enumerable Turing degrees (of which more later). This can now be seen to be the starting point for the reconstruction of Post's programme with the aim of characterising these links, which has become increasingly the focus of research and brought a number of deep and rewarding insights (see for instance Lachlan [1968a] , Shoenfield [1976] , Harrington and Soare [1996] , Cholak [1995] ).
The Structure D D D of the Turing Degrees
The second of Rogers' basic structures originates with Turing's [1939] notion of oracle computability: A set A (of natural numbers) is computable from a set B (written A ≤ T B ) if and only if one can uniformly compute " x ∈ A ?" using answers to at most a finite number of questions of the form "Is y ∈ B ?". Then the Turing degrees D D D are the equivalence classes under Turing equivalence (defined in the natural way and written ≡ T ), with ordering ≤ induced by ≤ T . Of course, notwithstanding current terminology, the definition of the Turing degrees first appeared in Post [1948] .
The problem of characterising Aut (D D D) depended on:
And it was not until nearly thirty years later that a construction of a nontrivial automorphism of D D D materialised (see Cooper [1997] ), giving, via Slaman and Woodin's proof of the existence of an automorphism base (as we shall later call it) of computably enumerable degrees, a wide range of nonrigid substructures of D D D -any invariant A , with E E E (the degrees of the computably enumerable sets)
But -unlike the situation with a number of other familiar nonrigid structures (e.g., the structure D D D m of the many-one degrees -see Odifreddi [ta1] ), a wide range of nontrivially definable relations on D D D has been discovered, starting with Jockusch and Simpson [1976] , and continuing through Nerode and Shore [1980a] , [1980b] , Jockusch and Shore [1984] , Nies, Shore and Slaman [1998] , to mention just a few notable additions. And the Turing degrees come very close to being rigid, in the sense that (see Nies, Shore and Slaman [1998] ) the degrees above 0 ′′ (the largest degree of a set computably enumerable using a computably enumerable set
We already see here an essential role for the jump operation, the jump a ′ of a degree a being got by relativising (to A ∈ a ) the information content intrinsic to any of the 1930s derivations of incomputable objects (e.g., Church [1936] , Turing [1936] ), and degree theoretically arising as the largest degree computably enumerable in a (that is, containing a set computably enumerable using an oracle for some A ∈ a ).
Again, there was no obvious suggestion available to Rogers for characterising the Turing invariant relations, but a useful start would have been an answer to:
Rogers' Question (c). Is the Turing jump invariant? Is the relation of being "computably enumerable in" invariant?
The answers, of course, are 'yes' (Cooper [1990a] ), and 'yes' (Cooper [1994] ). The first step here is the definability of 0 ′ , got using a relativised version of the Sacks [1963] Splitting Theorem, the Jockusch and Shore [1984] pseudo jump machinery, and a piece of local degree theory based on Lachlan [1975] nonsplitting. The unexpected and essential role of the theory of the degrees of differences of computably enumerable sets (the d.c.e. degrees) provides an illustration of the importance of curiosity-led research, rather than conventional 'foresight', in relation to advances in basic science. Specifically, the computably enumerable degrees are characterisable as the only degrees x for which cupping via another degree y ≤ x never leads to a non-trivial interval [y, x ∪ y] (where x ∪ y = l.u.b.{x, y} ) in which it is impossible to nontrivially split x ∪ y into two degrees u, v ≥ y with x ∪ y = u ∪ v . But the present state of knowledge of cupping and pseudo-jumps necessitates a two-part proof, with the definability of 0 ′ following from the x ≤ 0 ′ case, and the definability of the computably enumerable degrees in D D D(≤ 0 ′ ) requiring a separate construction in relation to x ≤ 0 ′ . Then the definability of the jump follows straightforwardly via relativisation, and that of 'computably enumerable in' on D D D via an adjusted relativisation of the proof of that of E E E .
Closely connected with the question of rigidity is that of 'homogeneity'.
(e ′ ) Same question, but with the jump and "computably enumerable in" included.
At the time, even if there turned out to be no non-trivial automorphisms, there was a very reasonable expectation of a positive answer to these based on the apparently universal relativisability of recursion theoretic constructions. There is now a very detailed knowledge of the limitations on homogeneity in the Turing degrees (see Odifreddi [ta2] ), and there are a number of known technical aspects of the theory not known to be relativisable -although this is all quite ad hoc in character and there is no known characterisation of the ingredients of a construction, and its underlying reducibility, necessary for relativisability.
Historically, the refutation of homogeneity in the form (e ′ ) above (a special case of what at one time was called 'strong homogeneity', although this too has come to have a different meaning -see Odifreddi [1989] ) was due to Feiner [1970] (using the theory of initial segments, see Lerman [1983] ). That of the full conjecture (e) immediately follows from the definability of the jump and the relation of 'computably enumerable in', but without that was proved by Shore [1979] .
Currently the best result along these lines (see Nies, Shore and Slaman [1998] 
here replaced by the respective degrees CEA (computably enumerable in, and above) a and b . And, given the implicit definability of a in arithmetic (Martin's [1968] result that projective determinacy gives an upper cone of elementarily equivalent upper cones making some such condition necessary), isomorphism can be replaced with elementary equivalence even (see Nies, Shore and Slaman [1998] , theorem 3.10). So, for instance (already known from Shore [1981] 
Much of the later history of Rogers' questions in relation to D D D (and degree structures in general) became that of the so-called 'bi interpretability conjecture', in its various manifestations, which did suggest a possible precise characterisation of Aut (D D D) , and of the Turing definable relations. We will return to this in section 6 below.
The Medvedev Lattice
The third structure is much less familiar, but has a very attractive theory, and is closely related to the better known ones. The underlying motivation is the need for a natural notion of an arbitrary class A ⊆ ω ω of problems (to be called a mass problem) being 'reducible' to another such class B , say. This is achieved by saying that A is reducible to B if and only if A ⊇ Φ(B) for some partial computable functional (or, more precisely, recursive operator ) Φ with B ⊆ domΦ . Then (following Medvedev [1955] ) one can define equivalence of mass problems in the usual way, and take the degrees of difficulty to be the resulting equivalence classes (written [f ] , f ∈ ω ω ), with an induced ordering ≤ . The resulting structure M M M = degrees of difficulty, ≤ is the Medvedev lattice.
Any given set A ⊆ ω (with characteristic function C A ) gives rise to two important examples of mass problems:
(1) S A = {C A } , or problem of solvability of A , and (2) E A = {f ∈ ω ω | range(f ) = A} , or problem of enumerability of A , which give rise, respectively, to the substructures of the degrees of solvability and the degrees of enumerability. Some basic easy to verify facts include:
( For a much fuller description of the known properties of the Medvedev lattice one should see the survey paper of Sorbi [1996] .
Once again, there are certain basic steps on the road to a full characterisation of the invariant relations on the structure, and its automorphism group. Concerning the questions involving invariance, there is, surprisingly, a simple and elegant definition in M M M of the degrees of solvability due to Dyment [1976] . They are the degrees x satisfying in M M M:
In other words, the degrees of solvability are characterised as those degrees The last structure considered by Rogers also has close connections with the Medvedev lattice, and reinforces the latter's claims to more attention than it has received so far.
Partial Functions and Enumeration Reducibility
The fourth structure seems to have been a particular favourite of Rogers, and appears in all sorts of places in different guises. It is based on the recognition of the existence of an alternative model of computability relative to auxiliary information (that is, of computability in a 'real' context) -instead of relying on an oracle which invariably answers queries to it, one may compute relative to information which emerges less predictably. Of course, for many purposes there is no distinction between the two models. But if one is interested in efficiency of computation, or in computation relative to partially known data, deficiencies in the standard Turing model cannot be ignored.
Intuitively, the content of the original definition of enumeration reducibility, in Friedberg and Rogers [1959] , was that a set A ⊂ ω is enumeration reducible to another such set B (written A ≤ e B ) if and only if there is an algorithm which always gives some enumeration of the members of A from any given enumeration of B . The basic nature of ≤ e is underlined by the way it leads to a natural notion ≤ of relative computability of partial functions:
which in this context is easily seen to be a notational variant of non-deterministic Turing reducibility (see McEvoy [1984] ):
This leads (in the usual way of associating degree structures with suitably wellbehaved reducibilities) to isomorphic structures P (the partial degrees of functions) ∼ = D D D e (the enumeration degrees of sets of numbers).
Another feature emphasising the basic nature of ≤ e is the existence of a natural embedding of D D D into D D D e -following from the fact that ≤ T and ≤ N T agree over the total functions, giving:
Moreover ( Sorbi [1990] for some further comments.
The other two questions now seem more approachable. We start by collecting information on just how special is D D D as a substructure of the enumeration degrees.
Some nice facts relating D D D to D D D e
A preliminary question concerns the relationship between ≤ e and the relation of being "computably enumerable in" -clearly A computably enumerable in B follows from A ≤ e B . This relationship was neatly characterised by Selman [1971] :
A ≤ e B ⇔ ∀X [B c.e. in X ⇒ A c.e. in X].
Using this, one can obtain a striking characterisation of D D D in D D D e in terms of the information content of TOT, due recently to C.G. Jockusch (private communication). The characterisation strengthens previously known ones (due to Case [1971] ) in terms of retraceable or regressive sets, and uses Jockusch's [1968] notion of introreducibility:
Then:
• ( Proof. If f is total, then graph (f ) ≡ e {σ ∈ ω <ω | σ ⊂ f } , an introreducible set of strings (which can of course be coded as numbers).
On the other hand say A is introreducible, and computably enumerable in a given X . (One may assume that A is not computably enumerable, since in that case A ∈ 0 e , the total degree consisting of all computably enumerable sets.) Then one can easily get an infinite subset C of A which is Turing computable from X . But then A ≤ T C ≤ T X and A ≤ T C ≤ T X , giving both A and A computably enumerable in X , and hence C A computably enumerable in X .
But then by Selman's characterisation of ≤ e , and the choice of X , one gets C A ≤ e A . And since trivially A ≤ e C A , A ≡ e C A , giving deg e (A) ∈ TOT. Medvedev [1955] ) is best illustrated by the fact (see Copestake [1988] ) that all 1-generic e-degrees are quasiminimal.
An extended discussion of the automorphism framework as it relates to D D D e would of course be inappropriate in this review of the influence of Hartley Rogers' 1967 paper on the history of computability theory (and is anyway precluded by constraints on length), but we will nevertheless provide a few more remarks of a descriptive nature.
The aim must be to build distinct enumeration degrees deg e (f ) , deg e (g) as witnesses to nontriviality of the automorphism * :
say, with the following features familiar from Cooper [1997] :
<ω , with these first two properties flowing from the fact that (3) Everything used in the construction is computably approximated, enabling one to build explicit replicas in D D D e , g of Turing relationships underlying D D D e , f , and vice-versa, while (4) All such Turing relationships are considered according to their specific places in the Turing contexts of f and g .
Then one has typical requirements of the form:
where Φ, Θ, Ψ is some standard enumeration of all triples of enumeration operators (or, to be more precise, of partial recursive operators derived from them). The aim is to choose computable approximations f s , g s to f and g at some stage s which will ensure that f cannot = Φ g for f, g ⊃ f s , g s , respectively. However, any consequent revision in the approximation to * must respect the Q -and Rrequirements.
Different aspects of the resulting procedures arise from the current approximations to the upward and downward (nondeterministic) Turing relationships to f s and g s . For instance, given τ = Θ f s and τ * s = Θ g s at stage s + 1 of the construction, and Φ g s (z) ↓ s for some potential witness for P Φ , one may want to choose f s+1 | f s ϑ(|τ |) , while restraining g s ϕ(z) . If Θ f s+1 extends incompatibly with τ at some later stage, existing axioms for Θ may demand a specific revision of the current approximation to (τ * s ) * −1 , precluded by the recent activity of other Qand R -requirements and associated axioms for their hatted enumeration operators. This means that at stage s + 1 , the action in relation to P Φ must be conditional on the existence of a τ ′ = Θ f s+1 for which one can choose a new τ ′ * s+1 extending τ * s . This much is familiar from the deterministic case. But one must also have regard for the fact that one may still be forced to observe a subsequent new approximation to Θ f s+1 necessitating related updating of Θ , due to the possibility of an augmentation of Dom Θ f s+1 involving arguments smaller than |τ * s | . This means that τ ′ * s+1 must match the named undefined part of τ ′ , allowing Θ to consistently replicate Θ on g at later stages.
In fact, of course, the search for suitable approximations to f and g yielding satisfaction of P Φ is a little more complicated, involving the setting up of finitely many pairs f i , g i with matching Turing environments, with Φ g i (z) ↓ at the stage at which any subsequent pair f i+1 , g i+1 is chosen, and with a level of cross-pair matching being the prerequisite for an eventual choice of f s+1 , g s+1 , say, equal to some f i , g j , respectively, with j < i . If this is the framework now in regard to the consideration of the effect on downward relationships to the current approximations to f and g , with the focus now being on R Ψ , one must now consider a situation in which one has, say, g s+1 = g i = Ψ τ * s and f j = Ψ τ at the current stage s + 1 , with resulting problems for Ψ following on the definition of f s+1 = f i . This requires that one define (τ * s ) * −1 s+1 = any such τ , and one must either (a) define τ * s+1 for each such τ compatibly with some π for which one already observes g i = Ψ π (ensuring that g i does include values inconsistent with g j ), or (b) be prepared to redefine τ * s+1 at a subsequent stage. The aim must be to avoid any later occurrence of
, enabling Ψ to continue to replicate relative to g s+1 consistently. Of course, the eventual choice must be a balance of options (a) and (b), just as for the deterministic case. Option (a) alone will lead to the attempted matching of unbounded Turing environments, with no guarantee of a termination to the matching process. On the other hand, option (b), unassisted, will disrupt the required emergence of * via the limiting properties of * s .
So the construction must put these typical aspects together, and cope with such extra tasks as:
(i) The combining of the atomic strategies, and the resulting matching of entangled Turing environments, while (ii) Ensuring that these environments arising from requirements of higher priority than a particular P -requirement are bounded in number, and (iii) The controlling of the stage-by-stage reorganisation of * to ensure that * is well-defined and bijective.
The important thing to note is that one obtains a finite injury construction, which is compatible with making g total and f of quasiminimal degree. It follows Of the major global questions concerning the structure of the enumeration degrees, it is also known:
• Homogeneity fails -since Gutteridge [1971] showed there to be no minimal enumeration degrees, while (see Cooper [1990b] ) there do exist degrees minimal in some D D D e (≥ a) , with a not total (in fact, by Calhoun and Slaman [1996] , with a of Π So it is essentially only nonrigidity which distinguishes the situation in regard to the global theory of the enumeration degrees from that as it pertained to the Turing degrees around twenty years ago.
It only remains to ask, in relation to invariance in degree structures:
What did Rogers not anticipate?
Not surprisingly, given that in 1965 all Rogers had was one definable Turing degree, and one Turing automorphism, and that the situation for the other structures was not very different, one can point to a number of unforseen major developments in relation to the main themes. As already noted, there was no attempt to suggest possible nontrivial characterisations of Aut (D D D) or of the Turing invariant relations, and little evidence in support of trivial ones. And there was no intimation of the extent of Turing definability, or of how pathology of degree structure would form the basis of increasingly powerful coding techniques -"the ultimate expression of such coding procedures", as Nies, Shore and Slaman (1996) describe, becoming "embodied in the [bi interpretability] conjecture that crystallized the new paradigm of complexity as a route to characterization".
The Bi Interpretability Conjecture gave formal substance to the intuition, arising from Simpson's [1977] Full success, of course, would have stifled the main engine of technique within computability theory, giving overnight, a subject mathematically perfect but dead at its core. Many questions would still have remained (for instance, in relation to local structures, strong reducibilities, computably enumerable sets), but applications, both mathematically and beyond, would be relatively limited, increasingly the appendages of other mathematically active areas.
As it is, there appeared a number of indications that bi interpretability had run its course. For instance:
(a) The predicted absolute definability of the Turing jump and the relation of 'c.e. in' were not derived using the coding techniques intrinsic to the bi interpretability programme.
(b) The best global results were not obtained via the general theory of codings (applicable over a range of degree structures), but via hybrid arguments using special features of the Turing structure (e.g., the definability of CEA). . But given that there may be no such nice characterisation of the Turing definable relations arising from our hugely increased knowledge of degree structures (it seems quite possible that the set of formulas of second-order arithmetic associated with Def(D D D) is not axiomatisable, or may even be recursively isomorphic to Th 2 (N ) ), even more basic questions are forced on one:
• What should computability theory be about?
•• Are there wider concerns capable of replacing those (exclusively mathematical ones) of the old paradigm? (For instance, does its demise expose very fundamental connections between computability theory and the underlying nature of the material universe, connections unrecognised during the recursion theoretic phase of the subject?)
And such questions, arising as they do naturally from the research programme initiated by Rogers' back in 1965 , are important, even if their answers arise in unexpected ways. As Kuhn [1962] points out (p. 109):
. . . paradigms provide scientists not only with a map but also with some of the directions essential for map-making. In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory, methods, and standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture. Therefore, when paradigms change, there are usually significant shifts in the criteria determining the legitimacy both of problems and of proposed solutions.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that of the many important and still unanswered technical problems relating to Rogers' 1965 talk, that concerning the existence or otherwise of a degree invariant solution to Post's problem -closely linked to the question of whether the jump a ′ of a degree a is uniquely definable (as a degree computably enumerable in and strictly above a ) -is absent from Rogers [1967a Rogers [ ], [1967a , appearing first in Sacks [1966] . See Downey and Shore [1997] for recent background information.
